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Contours of a Spatialized Politics: Homeless Vehicles and the Production of Geographical Scale

Neil Smith

The Homeless Vehicle is a jarring intervention in the landscapes of the evicted. Designed by Krzysztof Wodiczko, a New York artist, the vehicle was first exhibited in 1988. The prototype was constructed in consultation with homeless men and subsequently women; it was first tested in the streets of New York's Lower East Side, then elsewhere in the city and in Philadelphia. An ongoing project, it has undergone continual revision and modification, and there are now four variants. Its design and development has been funded by several art galleries and public art councils as well as by the artist himself, but it is more than simply a critical artwork heavy with symbolic irony; the Homeless Vehicle is deliberately practical. Indeed it works as critical art only to the extent that it is simultaneously functional.[1] In this symbiosis of the functional and symbolic object, the Homeless Vehicle reveals a vital dimension of a spatialized politics, namely the importance of scale.

Wodiczko's Homeless Vehicle and the Poliscar that followed it vividly express this politics of scale, and I begin with a discussion of these projects. There follows a brief discussion arguing more broadly that we lack any sophisticated language of spatial differentiation, and this theoretical project is taken up in the third section where I elaborate upon a schematic theory of the production of scale.

Homeless Vehicles

The Homeless Vehicle builds on the vernacular architecture of the supermarket trolley, and provides the space and means to facilitate some basic needs: transportation, sitting, sleeping, shelter, washing. Spatial mobility in particular is a central problem for people evicted from the private spaces of the real-estate market. Without a home or other place to store possessions, it is difficult to move around the city because you have to carry all your belongings with you. In the late 1980s in New York City, with homelessness estimated at between 70,000 and 100,000 people—between 1 percent and 1.4 percent of the city's population—many evictees took to using supermarket trolleys or canvas postal carts for ferrying their belongings around, and for scavenging cans and bottles that could be redeemed for their nickel deposit.[2] Wodiczko elaborates on this

Krzysztof Wodiczko, Homeless Vehicle, 1988. Photo by John Ranard.

Krzysztof Wodiczko, Poliscar, 1991. Photo by John Ranard.

appropriation. The lower compartment of the vehicle is designed to carry belongings—bags, clothes, blankets, food, water, empty cans.

Finding a place to sleep is also a major problem, and so the top compartment, which can be used to carry things by day, can also be pulled out into its three sections. Each section is draped with heavy plastic tarpaulin, and when expanded this upper compartment forms a sleeping space. Thus Wodiczko has also referred to it as a "shelter vehicle."[3] Daily ablutions too are a problem for the evicted: the vehicle's aluminum nose cone, satirically redolent of a rocket or some other high-tech military device, folds down to become a washbasin. In one model, Wodiczko tried to design a biochemical toilet on the rear of the vehicle, but this proved impractical.

An appropriately extreme response to mass social eviction, the Homeless Vehicle neither is, nor is meant to be, a solution. It "is not a home but illegal



Krzysztof Wodiczko, Poliscar, 1991. Photo by John Ranard.

real estate," according to Papo Colo, an "architecture provoked by poverty, a missile, the indication of flight, of retreat, or invasion and attack."[4] With the appearance of a high-precision military-industrial instrument, it expresses the social absurdity and obscenity of widespread homelessness in the capitalist heartland, but it does so only to the extent that the vehicle is rigorously functional. The prosaic usefulness of the nose cone for everyday needs contrasts abruptly with the pathological waste of a $300 billion defense budget, as if to point out that there is more social use in a single washbasin than in the entire national armory of high-tech junk. The supermarket trolley, a softer symbol, but nevertheless an icon of expansive consumerism, becomes a means of production as well as consumption, a basic technology for conducting daily life. The vehicle's absurdity depends on its practicality. It expresses and exposes the relations of empowerment and disempowerment defining homelessness.

Evicted from the private spaces of the real-estate market, homeless people occupy the public spaces, but their consequent presence in the urban landscape is fiercely contested. Their visibility is consistently erased by institutional efforts to move them elsewhere—to shelters, out of buildings and parks, to poor neighborhoods, out of the city, to other marginal spaces. Evicted people are also erased by the desperate personal campaigns of the housed to see no homeless, even as they step over bodies in the street. This ongoing erasure from the public gaze is reinforced by media stereotypes that either blame the victims and thereby justify their studied invisibility or else drown them in such lugubrious sentimentality that they are rendered helpless, social gumbies, the pathetic Other, excused from active civic responsibility and denied personhood.

The Homeless Vehicle is an impertinent invention that empowers the evicted to erase their own erasure. It "retaliates" by making homeless people visible and enhancing their identities, and it "dramatizes the right of the poor not to be isolated and excluded." Disrupting the ruling coherence of the urban landscape, it perpetrates a "socially created scandal"; it becomes "a vehicle for organizing the interests of the dominated classes into a group expression, employs design to illuminate social reality, supporting the right of these groups to refuse marginalization."[5] The Homeless Vehicle provides a potential means by which evictees can challenge and in part overcome the social dislocation imposed on them by homelessness. Emphatically not a solution, it works only partly and unevenly; it addresses most explicitly the needs of single male evictees and is less responsive to women's security needs or the needs of homeless families.

The tension between absurdity and functionality is expressed not simply through the vehicle's design, but through its practical revelation of the politics of daily life as inherently spatial. The Homeless Vehicle expresses a strategic political geography of the city. Evictees' immobility traps them in space, or rather traps them in the interstices of an urban geography produced and reproduced in such a way as to exclude them.[6] The Homeless Vehicle, by contrast, is simultaneously a means of production and reproduction allowing evictees to make and remake space in a way that enhances their means of survival. It is a means to carve a more sympathetic geographical politics in a city of exclusionary spaces. By allowing wider spatial mobility it opens up the possibilities for scavenging and panhandling, puts more distant can and bottle redemption centers within reach, makes new places accessible for sleeping, enables speedier and more effective escape in the face of police harassment and assaults, and in general streamlines the routine of daily life. "It facilitates the seizing of space by homeless subjects rather than containing them in prescribed locations." Operators of the Homeless Vehicle "possess space by their obligation to invent it." And enhanced mobility enhances the possibilities for public gathering and public organizing; it renders "the homeless" more dangerous to

the brittle coherence of the ruling political geographies of the city. The Homeless Vehicle specializes in what Don Mitchell calls the "subversiveness of mobility."[7]

Responding in part to criticisms and comments, Wodiczko has followed the Homeless Vehicle with a new vehicle for the evicted: the Poliscar. A startling hybrid between a Dalek from BBC's time-traveling *Doctor Who* and a World War I "cubist" tank, the Poliscar furthers the reconquest of urban space. Introduced in 1991, this vehicle takes much more seriously homeless people's need for security and privacy; the vehicle operator is wholly inside and there is room for more than one person. But more than anything else, the Poliscar enhances communication. For homeless people, Wodiczko says, the "contradiction of their existence . . . is that while they are physically confined to public spaces they are politically excluded from public space constituted as a space for communication."[8] Fitted with a CB radio, external camera, TV monitor, and a portable Microwave Link for transmitting visual images to other vehicles and receivers, the Poliscar also reverses the traditional direction of public surveillance. It conceals "the normally all-too-visible homeless person from view while at the same time using its cameras to submit respectable passers-by to surveillance of a kind that the state might normally apply to its own helpless outcasts."[9] Indeed, the Poliscar is intended as a democratization of urban space, giving evictees their own police powers while simultaneously invoking the possibility of freedom and democracy in a remade polis. Wodiczko envisages a network of Poliscars electronically connected across the city as the backbone of a "Homeless Communication Network" that would enhance the security, the economic and social opportunities, and political organizing of evictees.

The Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar were developed in the heat of antigentrification and homeless rights struggles in New York's Lower East Side. The focus of the struggles was Tompkins Square Park, where in August 1988 four hundred police rioted against evictees, squatters, local people, punks, housing activists, anarchists, and other park users demonstrating to prevent the imposition of a curfew. For the next three years Tompkins Square Park was the node of housing and homeless struggles in the city. As many as three hundred evictees used the park as a place to live, erecting tents, shanties, and other shelters, while the squatters movement expanded throughout the Lower East Side. There were continual demonstrations in defense of what had become a liberated space, and the police and the city responded with periodic sweeps of the park. This phase of the contest over space for the evicted ended in June 1991 when the city cleared the park, erected an eight-foot fence around it, and began a fourteen-month physical rehabilitation and redesign of Tompkins Square. Several shanty and tent encampments—dubbed "Dinkinsvilles" after the mayor—emerged on derelict blocks near the park, but they too were cleared several months later.[10]

The Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar appropriate and express the political ambition of these struggles from the perspective of many homeless people, and they express the central realization that political liberation requires spatial access. They provide oppositional means for reinscribing and reorganizing the urban geography of the city, but they do so in a very specific way. They open new spaces of interaction but not randomly. Rather they stretch the urban space of productive and reproductive activity, fracture previous boundaries of daily intercourse, and establish new ones. They convert spaces of exclusion into the known, the made, the constructed. In short, they redefine the scale of everyday life for homeless people. The liberatory intent of the Homeless Vehicle and the Poliscar, the political empowerment they facilitate, the sharpness of the contradiction between absurdity and functionality, these all hinge on this reinscription of geographical scale. They unselfconsciously seek to expand the scale of self-centered control and at the same time contract the scale of official control. They promise not just the production of space in the abstract, but the concrete *production and reproduction of geographical scale* as a political strategy of resistance. As instruments of political empowerment, Wodiczko's vehicles work precisely to the extent that, symbolically and practically, they enable evicted people to "jump scales"—to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to resist oppression and exploitation at a higher scale—over a wider geographical field. The chants of Tompkins Square expressed the same ambition. From the immediate retort—"Whose park is it? It's our fucking park!"—the chant changed in the first days of defending the park to: "Tompkins Square Everywhere." The struggle was defeated precisely at the point where it failed to mobilize tenants, housing activists, and homeless people citywide. Put differently, jumping scales allows evictees to dissolve spatial boundaries that are largely imposed from above and that contain rather than facilitate their production and reproduction of everyday life.

Space, Difference, and Metaphor

I have chosen to interpret the Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar in a way that retrieves from a habitual invisibility the spatiality of local politics and especially the constitutive role of geographical scale. The contemporary reassertion of space in social discourse is by now well documented and widely discussed, and emanates from various sources: geographers whose traditional concern with material space was dramatically enlivened and rendered social in the wake of the political uprisings of the 1960s and the spatial restructurings at all geographical scales that followed; social theorists of the 1970s and 1980s for whom, in the context of the rigorously historicist tradition that has dominated social thought arguably since the eighteenth century, space is being rediscovered as a neglected world of potentially novel and unexplored concepts; and literary and cultural theorists, especially but not exclusively feminists, for

whom the language of space has yielded a reservoir of freshly revealing metaphors and new meanings.[11] These different expositions and rediscoveries of space have in their own ways been highly political projects, whether an effort to understand the constructed geographies of capitalism or to employ a spatial language for decentering previously dominant political concerns (e.g., class) and complementing or replacing them with new ones such as gender and race. Others would surely put it differently, but Fredric Jameson may be the most explicit—and he is certainly not alone—in coming to the conclusion that "culture" is "increasingly dominated by space and spatial logic" and that, further, "a model of political culture appropriate to our own situation will necessarily have to raise spatial issues as its fundamental organizing concern."[12]

A central obstacle in this reassertion of space, however, lies in the lack of any articulated language of spatial difference and differentiation. Insofar as the grammar of social theory has been avowedly historicist, a language of temporal difference has been developed as a means to delineate different experiences. It is hardly that historians agree to some objective and universally applicable division of social history into formal eras and epochs; rather, the significant point is that the intensely political debates and struggles that go into the continual definition and redefinition of historical periods are not at all replicated vis-à-vis space. No such contentiousness has evolved over the categories and politics of spatial differentiation. Where are the political debates over the scale at which neighborhoods are constructed, the boundaries of the urban, what makes a region, the scale of the nation-state—or indeed, what makes the global scale? It is not that such debates have never occurred—they have, although they have generally been obscure[13]—but that regardless, the division of the world into localities, regions, nations, and so forth is essentially taken for granted.

In "western" social theory throughout the twentieth century, the subordination of space to time meant that spatial difference was usually either ignored or, conversely, treated as trivial: spatial difference pervaded social theory only to the extent that one could see different social processes and patterns in different places. Accordingly, space per se (as opposed to the social events that happened "in" space or "across" space) was treated as self-evident, unproblematic, and unrequiring of theory. Geographers who might have been expected to develop a language of spatial differentiation were indeed centrally concerned with spatial questions and not at all inclined to dismiss space, but they harbored nonetheless a disastrous reticence toward theory in general, and a complete reluctance to see geographical scale as socially constructed. With only rare exceptions, they too trivialized geographical scale as merely a question of methodological preference for the researcher. The clearest such trivialization undoubtedly came with the particularly conservative strain of regional geography which emanated from the United States between the 1930s and the early 1960s, and which based itself on the unexamined edifice of a peculiarly

historicist neo-Kantianism still rooted in eighteenth-century idealism.[14] While it was certainly meritorious to have asked "How are regions defined?" mid-century American geographers resorted to an anti-intellectual renunciation of the very real social processes of regionalization when they answered in virtual harmony: "Any way you want them to be defined."

Thus, the significance of the Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar, in the context of antigentrification and homeless rights struggles, should be more sharply evident. Several propositions are involved: first, the construction of geographical scale is a primary means through which spatial differentiation "takes place"; second, an understanding of geographical scale might provide us with a more plausible language of spatial difference; third, the construction of scale is a social process, i.e., scale is produced in and through societal activity which in turn produces and is produced by geographical structures of social interaction; and fourth, the production of geographical scale is the site of potentially intense political struggle.

If these propositions have even partial validity, then a theoretical exploration of the production of scale might help to provide both a language and a set of connections for dealing with spatial difference. But before pursuing such an inquiry, it is important to clarify the language of space and scale I intend here. For quite different conceptions are invoked in this broader rediscovery of space, and it is vital that they be made explicit. As Foucault once put it, this is a task of "making the space in question precise."[15] In particular, the metaphorical uses of space that have become so fashionable in literary and cultural discourse seem increasingly divergent from the more material conceptions of space that have dominated the "new" geographies of the last two decades. This is nothing so simple as a semantic contest between supposedly real and ideal conceptions of space, but a quite contested rapprochement between multiple political visions. It was also Foucault, of course, who argued that while temporal metaphors tapped questions of individual consciousness, the effort "to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through, and on the basis of relations of power."[16] Not only is the production of space an inherently political process, then, but the use of spatial metaphors, far from providing an innocent if evocative imagery, actually taps directly into questions of social power.

Much social and cultural theory in the last two decades has depended heavily on spatial metaphors.[17] The myriad "decenterings" of modernism and of reputedly modern agents (e.g., the working class), the "displacement" of political economy by cultural discourse, and a host of other "moves" have been facilitated by a very fertile lexicon of spatial metaphors: subject positionality, locality, mapping, grounding, travel, (de/re)centering, theoretical space, ideological space, symbolic space, conceptual space, space of signification, territo-

rialization, and so forth. If such metaphors functioned initially in a very positive way to challenge, aerate, and even discard a lot of stodgy thinking, they may now have taken on a much more independent existence that discourages as much as it allows fresh political insight. These spatial metaphors may not yet be entirely out of control,[18] but they are headed that way, and a little timely reflection may not be a bad idea. Foucault's fleeting reflection on the purposes of spatial metaphor is rare, nor indeed did he pursue it; for the most part these spatial metaphors are employed unselfconsciously.

This distinction between material and metaphoric conceptions of space is obviously overstated as I have laid it out here. The material and metaphorical are by definition mutually implicated and no clear boundary separates the one discretely from the other. Metaphors greatly enhance our understanding of material space—physical space, territory—just as our spatial practices and conceptions of material space are fecund raw material for metaphor. I do not intend any crude dualism here, nor am I somehow trying to discard metaphor; that would be an absurd project. Instead, I think that it is necessary to articulate the connections between material and metaphorical conceptions of space in order to understand the sources and potential of metaphorical power. Only in this way are we likely to be able to prevent the meanings from following the metaphors out of control.

The central danger in an unreflective use of spatial metaphors is that it implicitly repeats the asymmetries of power inherent in traditional social discourse. Foucault again gives the most vivid description: "Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic."[19] This asymmetrical relationship between time and space assumes history as the independent variable, the actor, and geography as the dependent—the ground on which events "take place," the field within which history unfolds. Where geography is self-evidently given—it simply is—history hides all the secrets of social complexity. If the blossoming of spatial metaphors seems at first sight to represent an enervation of history and the championing of a reenergized space, things are not always what they seem. In fact, spatial metaphors tend to reinforce precisely this deadness of space. Metaphor works in many different ways but it always involves an assertion of otherness. Difference is expressed in similarity. Some truth or insight is revealed by asserting that an incompletely understood object, event, or situation *is* another, where the other is assumed known: social definition (by race, for example) is called "location" because it reveals the connection between social experience and place in the social structure; emerging ideas are said to occupy a distinct "theoretical space" because such an imagery puts the clutter of existing and competing ideas at some remove—in another "space." In all such spatial metaphors, space is assumed as the unproblematic Other, already known, and this suggests the Janus face of metaphor. To the extent that

metaphor continually appeals to some other assumed reality as known, it systematically disguises the need to investigate the known.

Spatial metaphors evoke a very specific and contested representation of space. They assume as given what geographers, physicists, and philosophers all recognize as "absolute space." In its absolute conception, space is represented as a field or container, inherent emptiness, within which the location of all objects and events can be fixed using a simple coordinate system. It is the dead, fixed, and immobile space of which Foucault talked, and it presents itself for metaphorical service today precisely because, with all other rigidities rendered fluid in poststructuralist and postmodern social theory, the fixity of absolute space provides the anchor that tethers otherwise free-floating ideas to material experience. Refracted in the mirror of a highly rigid absolute space, metaphorical space carves out "room to move," the space in which to be fecund, dialectical, life-giving. It is in this way that metaphorical space gains its richness—at the expense of material space, whose impoverishment it reinforces. Indeed, the metaphors succeed only by retaining the most traditional and most totalizing of modernist spatial concepts. Insofar as they problematize the universal assumption of absolute space, notions such as Henri Lefebvre's "production of space" also render problematic the whole range of spatial metaphors grounded in the assumption of absolute space.[20] Absolute space can no longer be equated with some naively given "real space" even for the purpose of grounding alternative metaphors.

In providing a language of spatial differentiation, a more formal discussion of geographical scale may provide some clues for connecting material and metaphorical conceptions of space.

The Production of Scale—Schematic Exploration

It is possible to conceive of scale as the geographical resolution of contradictory social processes of competition and cooperation. The continual production and reproduction of scale expresses the social as much as geographical contest to establish boundaries between different places, locations, and sites of experience. The making of place implies the production of scale insofar as places are made different from each other; scale is the criterion of difference not between places so much as between different kinds of places. When I first began to think of scale in this way I conceived it in largely political/economic terms.[21] To take an obvious example, it is possible to see the scale of the nation-state as a territorial compromise between differing needs of the capitalist class. On the one hand competition between producers is basic to the capitalist economy, yet unrestrained competition threatens anarchy; the capitalist class also cooperates internally in order to create the appropriate conditions for capital accumulation and social reproduction, and to deal with challenges to its power. If hardly thought out with quite such explicit or detached voluntarism amidst

national formation, the nation-state represents an enduring but ultimately temporary and historically specific territorial resolution of this contradiction between competition and cooperation. Within the geographical boundaries of the nation-state, the national ruling class cooperates broadly over such questions as the conditions for reproducing labor power, legal constitution of the economy, provision of infrastructures of production and circulation, and certain ideological institutions, even as separate capitals compete for markets, capital, labor, technology, land. Between different national markets there is also occasional cooperation, but it is economic competition that prevails.

The resolution of this particular contradiction pivots on the structure of the nation-state. That there is no abrupt and clearly demarcated boundary between competition and cooperation, that it is obvious that producers of similar products and services compete within the nation-state while nations can also cooperate—this does not belie such a conceptualization of the nation state but rather confirms it. The territorial boundaries of the national scale elicit a (sometimes weakly, sometimes strongly) ordered alignment of cooperative and competitive economic relations. If the consequent territorialization of conflict resolution takes on a certain fixity in the landscape—national boundaries, for example—it is also marked by long-term fluidity. As the scale of economic accumulation expands and with it the necessary scale of competition and cooperation, the territorially institutionalized form of resolution becomes increasingly obsolete, and alternative spatial forms are developed. This is the significance of the United Nations, international trading cooperatives such as ASEAN or COMECON, a unified Western Europe, or the North American Free Trade Agreement, all of which provide alternative (higher) geographical scales at which this particular contradiction is resolved—again presumably temporarily. But it is also the significance of Yugoslavia and of the former Soviet Union where the imposition of national unity for political and economic reasons has proven unsustainable in social and cultural terms.

At the other end of the hierarchy of scales, the Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar highlight the way in which the scale of the community is constructed. While there is obviously an economic dimension to the functionality of the Homeless Vehicle, its significance is much broader, involving political and cultural access to, and production of, the space of the community; it challenges the ideological definition of community. The Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar emphasize the connection between the everyday details of social reproduction and the construction of space at different scales.[22] Feminist work has long focused on the home and community as a means to understand the relationship between social production and reproduction, and more recently feminist writing has explored the scale of the body. Grounded in both material and metaphorical appropriations of space, and emphasizing social and cultural processes, this theoretical work on the body nonetheless connects in many different ways to the more geographical focus of, for example, discussions of the

nation-state. A coherent spatialized politics will have to find a way of exposing these connections. As Lefebvre argues: "Any revolutionary 'project' today, whether utopian or realistic, must, if it is to avoid hopeless banality, make the reappropriation of the body, in association with the reappropriation of space, into a non-negotiable part of its agenda."[23]

The construction of scale is not simply a spatial solidification or materialization of contested social forces and processes; the corollary also holds. Scale is an active progenitor of specific social processes. In a literal as much as metaphorical way, scale both *contains* social activity, and at the same time provides an already partitioned geography within which social activity *takes place*. Scale demarcates the sites of social contest, the object as well as the resolution of contest. Viewed this way, the production of scale can begin to provide the language that makes possible a more substantive and tangible spatialized politics. "The orderliness of respectability," says Iris Young, "means things are under control, everything in its place, not crossing the borders."[24] It is geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which control is exerted *and* contested.

I want to explore this further by examining a sequence of specific scales: body, home, community, urban, region, nation, global. I want to focus loosely on at least four aspects of each scale: (1) identity, or the characteristics that render each scale coherent; (2) internal differences; (3) borders with other scales; and (4) political possibilities for resistance inherent in the production of specific scales, the abrogation of boundaries, the "jumping of scales."

A few caveats are necessary before broaching such a schematic and exploratory discussion. With this typology of discretely different scales I am not implying some rigid separation of spatial spheres. As the Homeless Vehicle suggests, it is precisely the active social connectedness of scales that is vital, yet we have no coherent, critically thought-out language for different scales. The strategic bias in what follows is therefore toward differences rather than homologies of scale. Yet the importance of "jumping scales" lies precisely in this active social and political connectedness of apparently different scales, their deliberate confusion and abrogation. Second, the hierarchical character of this typology is deliberate, and reflects a practical rather than philosophical judgment. I am in no way proposing some ontological system of scales; rather, geographical scale is hierarchically produced as part of the social and cultural, economic and political landscapes of contemporary capitalism and patriarchy. The point is precisely not to "freeze" a set of scales as building blocks of a spatialized politics, but to understand the social means and political purposes through and for which such freezing of scales is nonetheless accomplished—albeit fleetingly. These different scales are better seen as nested rather than hierarchical, the hierarchical ordering of scales being a certain candidate for abolition in a revolutionized social geography; by discussing challenges to and political contests over specific scales—jumping scales—I hope to indicate ways in which this might be accomplished, places from which it could be made

to happen. Finally, although it stretches from the scale of the body to the global, this typology is inherently incomplete and open-ended. It could hardly be otherwise if, as I have claimed, scale is actively produced. At best, this typology provides a framework for organizing a more coherently thought out analysis of spatial difference.

Body. The primary physical site of personal identity, the scale of the body, is socially constructed. The place of the body marks the boundary between self and other in a social as much as physical sense, and involves the construction of a "personal space" in addition to a literally defined physiological space. The body is also a "cultural locus of gender meanings," according to Judith Butler, and this suggests that, more than most scales, the identity of the body per se is closely intertwined with its internal differences.[25] The dialectic of identity and difference is central to the definition of scale but nowhere more important than with the body. Indeed Simone de Beauvoir argued that masculine culture identifies women with the sphere of the body while reserving for men the privilege of disembodiment, a noncorporeal identity.[26] Not just gender, obviously, but other forms of social difference are constructed around the identity of the body. Young in particular argues that "the scaling of bodies" appropriates a variety of corporeal differences in addition to sex—most obviously race, but also age and ability—as the putative bases for social oppression and "cultural imperialism."[27]

As the site of biological reproduction, the body has specific needs that are equally social in definition and delivery. As the site of pleasure and pain, it also has wants, desires, and fears, and it is the biological organ around which social definitions of sickness and health are constructed. Care for the body, physical access to and by the body, and control over the body are the central avenues of contest at this scale. If women do not necessarily monopolize the scale of the body, as Beauvoir suggests, contests at this scale are nonetheless dominated by gender. The politics of abortion, rape, prostitution, reproduction, and body-care (the provision and preparation of food, clothing, shelter, warmth, beauty) focus on access to women's bodies, work women do with their bodies, and the boundary between individual and state control over the body. The manual *Our Bodies, Ourselves* helped galvanize an emerging feminist movement in the early 1970s precisely because it enabled women to reclaim their bodies and control the conquest of the scale of the body; it affirmed the body as a site of struggle over which feminists staked a powerful claim. The same boundary between individual and state control of the body is contested in the politics of abortion and of sexual preference. The politics of the body are not delineated by gender alone, of course, no matter how dominant gender is at this scale. Bodily style and clothing mediate personal constructions of identity with regional, national, and global cultures and provide access to the body by the international fashion industry: Benetton leads the world in the cultural conquest of bodies in action. Gendered as it is, bodily style is also a class question.

The impudence of the Homeless Vehicle and Poliscar demonstrates the

importance of access *by* the body to wider spaces—bodily access as a means of jumping scales—but history reveals less cryptic examples. Sallie Marston interprets the turn-of-the-century "voluntary motherhood" movement in a parallel way. Determined to control fertility and the number of births, women activists transformed the norms of their own sexuality and, in the process of constructing a movement for "domestic feminism," challenged a variety of assumptions and ideals about the wider social roles of women. Marston asks succinctly: "[H]ow did women construct the various scales of resistance from the body to the home to the community, the state and the nation-state *and* how was knowledge and meaning translated between and among scales . . . leading eventually to transformations of the boundaries of difference with the wider male dominated social world?"[28] These women, she argues, refused even to recognize the imposed differences of scale between body, home, and community.

Since the emergence of AIDS in the early 1980s, the most unprecedented contest for the body has been played out on a global scale. First labeled GRID (Gay-Related Immune Deficiency) by the medical profession, and traced to Central Africa and Haiti, AIDS is still generally vilified as the result of voluntary mistreatment of one's own body. The political and professional response to AIDS has involved a hardening of spatial boundaries at all spatial scales. The United States refuses to admit noncitizens who test HIV-positive; national governments advocate compulsory AIDS testing; Cuba incarcerates AIDS victims while many other national governments wish ruefully they could do likewise; communities expel HIV-positive students from local schools; police forces are issued surgical gloves for use in gay and lesbian demonstrations; physical attacks against gays and lesbians burgeon along with the moral cacophany against drugs and for sexual abstinence. The containment of AIDS is a highly spatial strategy which, by policing the boundaries of different scales, reinforces social differences as spatial ones. The boundaries not just of the body but of all other places the body might go are subject to heightened surveillance. The response from AIDS activists such as ACT UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power) and gay and lesbian organizations such as Queer Nation has been to refuse, at all scales, social containment on the pretext of medical control. The most symbolic refusal of containment may have come with Douglas Crimp's defiant appeal for principled promiscuity.[29]

The Home. The site of personal and familial reproduction, the home is a physical location and perhaps a structure—permanent or temporary. Routine acts of social reproduction—eating, sleeping, sex, cleansing, childrearing—are based (but not exclusively practiced) in and around the home. If the size of the home, its external appearance, and location are largely a function of class difference, and in some societies racial difference, the home per se is a heavily gendered site in many societies and is viewed as the locus of female activity,

contrasting with a wider masculine realm. The form taken by this gendering differs widely, in part as a result of very different definitions of "family" and the household. Internally, the differentiation of the home can vary from a simple inside/outside dichotomy to a more elaborate division; it represents a spatialization of different social experiences, activities, and functions or combinations thereof, and is furnished accordingly. The interrelatedness of class and gender differences is suggested by Witold Rybczynski's study of the formation and identity of the bourgeois home: "The feminization of the home in seventeenth-century Holland," which pioneered bourgeois domesticity, he argues, "was one of the most important events in the evolution of the domestic interior." The formation of the nuclear family in the European working class was also dependent on the separation of the home from paid work which came with the rise of the factory system.[30] Age and social function also divide the home into different uses and places which usually nonetheless retain the markings of class and gender difference—bedroom, kitchen, bathroom, dining room, study, smoking room, playroom, in recent Euro-American culture. The differentiation of the home might also take on the simpler geometrical polarities of front/back or upstairs/downstairs.[31]

The borders of the home may be sharply defined, as in the walls of a structure or the markers of private property that include other private space, such as garden or courtyard—a relatively recent and geographically specific invention—or more fluidly defined as the space of the home fades into community space. Internally, the home is a contested zone, especially in gender terms, with the wider, socially sanctioned authority of men pitted, in numerous cultures, against the modicum of domestic authority held by women rooted in the routine of the home. If the interest of men lies largely in containing women within the home, the interest of women lies more in extending the power and pride experienced in the home to higher geographical scales. Both castle and prison house, the home is socially if not always physically walled, and access out as well as in is controlled in various ways. As a means to control access to women's bodies, for example, the scope especially of young women's mobility can be severely restricted to the environs of the home, whether formally in many Islamic cultures with the tradition of purdah, or less formally, as in many inner cities in the United States.[32]

Although it was suggested that the scale of the body defines the site of personal identity, the scale of the home provides the most immediate context within which this takes place. Homelessness is a dramatic loss of power over the way in which one's identity is constructed since, for the homeless person, the home no longer shields the public gaze. Wodiczko captures and reverses this brilliantly with the Poliscar. More widely, squatting reasserts rights to social privacy against the dictates of economic privacy protected in the real-estate market. The home itself is defined within a larger context, and no matter

how sharp the physical boundary separating homes from each other, these borders always retain some porosity. Economic change, neighborhood-wide disinvestment in the housing stock, or the expansion or contraction of local transportation systems, for example, can severely affect the property values of individual homeowners regardless of their own actions in and on the home. Porosity is equally marked in the opposite direction insofar as the home becomes the geographical basis for political struggle and mobilization. In a case study of working-class housing activism in Harlem, Leavitt and Saegert find that women predominate in tenant and neighborhood organizations largely because they refuse to recognize the physical boundaries of the home but instead treat the community as a virtually borderless extension of the home.[33] The Homeless Vehicle makes the same move; it is simultaneously home and antihome.

Community. The community is properly conceived as the site of social reproduction, but the activities involved in social reproduction are so pervasive that the identity and spatial boundaries of community are often indistinct. In addition to a grouping of homes, the community incorporates myriad intertwined social and cultural institutions—educational, religious, recreational—themselves intertwined with the local state. It also includes places of work, from the home to the factory, the office to the store. To the extent that such institutions take a fixed form, they become distinct places within the community. Community is therefore the least specifically defined of spatial scales, and the consequent vagueness yet generally affirmative, nurturing meaning attached to "community" makes it one of the most ideologically appropriated metaphors in contemporary public discourse. From "the community of nations" fighting a murderous war against Iraq, to "the business community" attempting to justify class-based exploitation, the idea of community is appropriated to rescript less salubrious realities. Identities established at other scales are easily rolled into struggles over community.

Communities are socially defined and can take very different spatial forms. Working-class communities in contemporary advanced capitalist cities may be broadly homologous with the spatial confines of a neighborhood. The identity of the neighborhood and community may significantly overlap, based on intraclass characteristics such as type of work, ethnicity, race, national origin, or some vaguer continuity of tradition, social propinquity, or identification of property with place. This certainly describes many rural communities, but also New York's Lower East Side. Herbert Gans's "urban village" in Boston's North End is perhaps the classic exemplar. The upper classes, meanwhile, construct and live in a very different kind of community, usually with a far wider spatial reach, rarely coterminous with any spatially contiguous neighborhood, and more diffusely defined: the Kennedys hardly live in an Irish neighborhood. In addition to the environs of the home, upper-class communities may include

the locale of a summer home hundreds or even thousands of miles away, the private school where the kids are sent, and a whole orbit of noncontiguous but habitually visited places.[34] It is not just that the rich express their freedom by their ability to overcome space while the poor are more likely to be trapped in space; differential access to space leads to differential power in constructing the spatial scale of daily, weekly, and seasonal life.

The spatialization of struggles at this scale is central to the social identity of the community. In the summer of 1989, Yusef K. Hawkins, a black teenager, went to buy a car in Bensonhurst, a virtually all-white, heavily Italian part of Brooklyn. A mob of white male teenagers, claiming he was the new boyfriend of a neighborhood girl, attacked and murdered him. Defense of community here involved not just reactionary violence but the conflation of several scales at which identity is constructed, not just a "defense" of the neighborhood against nonwhites but also a patriarchal defense of "community property"—the woman's body. But place-based struggles can also galvanize a more progressive response as previously fragmented social groups coalesce into a politically defined community. Thus in many British cities in 1981, amidst tumultuous uprisings sparked by unemployment, police brutality, and racist attacks on blacks and Asians, many young Asians, who had traditionally seen themselves as quite separate from and even superior to British blacks and Afro-Caribbeans, began to call themselves "black," in a clear act of solidarity expressing their own experience of racism. Despite opposition from older Afro-Caribbeans who resented the petit-bourgeois status of many Asians, and from whites who feared the consequent racial unity, the broadened label stuck. As the scale of black identity was thereby expanded, the scale of struggle against racism was unified and expanded. If the body is the immediate source of corporeal difference appropriated in the construction of racism, it is at the scale of the community that racism and indeed every form of localism is most firmly rooted. Its local roots notwithstanding, racism is every bit a global construct of the financial markets and cultural privilege, encapsulated in the reality of the "third world."

Community-based struggles that are not simply defensive develop as political recognition of social identity—class, race, national origin, environmental vulnerability—emancipated from parochial spatial constraint. Spatial definition is not abandoned, but as with Tompkins Square Park and the Lower East Side, the respatialization of community and consequent definition of scale can become either a means of constraining struggles within fixed borders or expanding them into new spaces. Thus it was primarily the scale of the community that Harvey had in mind when he argued that "working-class movements are . . . generally better at organizing in and dominating *place* than they are at commanding *space*."[35]

Urban Space. The urban represents the daily sphere of the labor market. It

involves the most accomplished centralization of capital and social resources devoted to social production, consumption, and administration. Manuel Castells defines "the specificity of the urban" as the field of "collective consumption," the realm of reproduction, as opposed to the regional, which he sees as the scale of production.[36] While this distinction is suggestive, Castells falsely equates consumption and reproduction, and confuses the borders of the urban with the identity of the urban scale.

Urban space is divided according to different activities and functions. In contemporary capitalist cities, the allocation of different land uses to different spaces is largely mediated through the land market with its system of differential ground rent, aided and abetted by zoning. Differential levels of ground rent facilitate a spatial sorting of commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, and other activities. Within the city, the ground rent structure, government policy, and private financial institutions create a differentiation of residential space largely but not exclusively along class and race lines, a structural differentiation that is culturally constructed into a mosaic of neighborhood enclaves. The most definitive spatial distinction in the advanced capitalist city has involved the separation of work and home, precipitating a gendered urban geography, but with the emergence of gentrification and the integration of the suburbs in recent decades together with the resurgence of homeworking and the increasing percentage of women who work outside the home, the gendered geography of the city is being restructured.[37]

The unprecedented growth of cities over the last few centuries reflects both the dramatic centralization of capital and the development of the means of transportation that allowed increasing geographical dispersion. Most urban areas are legally defined by administrative boundaries, but these only accidentally reflect the range of everyday social intercourse. The spatial extent of the urban scale is demarcated much more acutely by the field over which a daily journey to work is feasible.

The coherence of the urban scale is challenged in a series of ways. Internal to capital, ground rent is a periodically unreliable means of allocating land uses insofar as it also responds to larger signals in the economy and transmits wider economic disruptions to the urban scale. By contrast, rapid urban development can also disrupt the coherence of the urban scale insofar as escalating land values and the receding spatial boundaries of the suburban fringe force many of the working class to choose between a dilapidated neighborhood and a several-hour commute. Either way, urban development puts significant pressure on the value of labor. To the extent that larger conurbations incorporate larger and larger concentrations of oppressed and exploited people often in distinct communities, and provide them too with the means of transport, the economic requirements of an expanded labor market also create the conditions for political organization of the oppressed. Urban fiscal crises, whether periodic or

chronic, bring cutbacks in services (the means of reproduction) and employment around which citywide organization can emerge, while continued expansion endangers the very economic and environmental conditions that stimulated growth, provoking the emergence of no-growth movements.

Region. The site of economic production, the regional scale is closely bound up with the larger rhythms of the national and global economy, and regional identity is constructed disproportionately around the kinds of work performed there. The region can be conceived as a concentrated network of economic connections between producers, suppliers, distributors, and myriad ancillary activities, all located in specific urban or rural locations, "ensembles of production" in Scott's terms.[38] Traditional regional geography identified agricultural and industrial regions on precisely this basis: for late nineteenth-century Britain, Lancashire meant cotton, Yorkshire was woolens and heavy engineering, the Clyde was shipbuilding, the West Midlands electrical engineering. The same kind of regional mosaic could be identified in other national and international spaces—New England was a favorite. This regional structure was specific to the early industrial stage of capitalist development, but the emergence of Fordism in the postwar world was accompanied by a radical change in regional structure and a dramatic expansion of the regional scale. New England, for example, ceased to be the mosaic of local regions it had been prior to the depression, but by the late 1960s had become part of a larger coherent region incorporating the whole Northeast.[39]

If productive activities—specific forms of industry and agriculture, tourism and mining, for example—define the broad contours of regional identity, the rhythms of daily, weekly, and seasonal life etch a distinctive cultural identity for some regions more than others. In arguing that what people are "coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and *how* they produce," Marx and Engels should be read as proposing not some universal ontology of individual identity but a social theory connecting work and culture most applicable at the regional scale.[40] If the emphasis here is increasingly on economic relationships, this does not imply a diminished social construction of geography. It does, however, imply that the social and cultural construction of the regional scale is less the result of immediate individual and local agency and is, rather, mediated to a greater extent through more generalized cultural, political, and especially economic structures.

The social division of labor is most sharply expressed in spatial terms at the regional scale. Different social conditions, means, and levels of production differentiate between and among various urban and rural places. Much as it is internally constructed, the social economy of the region is also fashioned in the swirl of national and international economic processes, events, and developments, and insofar as regions specialize in specific types and conditions of production, making commodities or selling services for a wider market, regional

borders are highly porous and changeable. While postwar New England lost much of its traditional regional identity, merging into a larger Northeast, the deindustrialization of the 1960s and 1970s in turn eroded the territorial coherence of this larger Northeastern region. The Northeast fragmented into a mosaic of much smaller regions at the behest of larger economic and political shifts at the national and global scales. Conversely, new patterns of high-technology growth, a shift toward producer and consumer services, and a move toward flexible specialization in production processes and output began to establish very different regional ensembles, such as Silicon Valley, which reconstituted regional space at a diminished scale.[41]

Insofar as regional identity focuses on productive activity, regional struggles are disproportionately class struggles with work as the basis of political organization. Questions of gender and race are closely intertwined with class, of course, as when employers deliberately locate facilities where a female or white labor force is readily available, but these social differences are not definitive of the regional scale. Intraclass cooperation enhances interclass competition, and the spatial organization of class cooperation and competition contributes centrally to the definition of regional boundaries. The fragmentation of the Northeast in recent decades was not simply the result of economic recession and absorption into the world market; in a series of contract givebacks, several powerful unions relinquished national- and regional-scale bargaining for myriad separate local agreements.[42] The restructured regional geographies of the 1980s and 1990s are marked by the same fluidity and flexibility.

Regional political movements may be highly defensive, combatting some perceived external invasion. This would apply to some antideindustrialization coalitions of recent years which identified external capital or foreign nations as the villain, but it also describes some emerging environmental and antigrowth coalitions. Most defensive of all, politically very diverse, and often the most volatile are those regional movements based less directly on political economic demands than on historic, possibly romantic, cultural claims that seek to reinstate certain regions as separate nation-states. Regional difference and chauvinism here work to contain class-based and other regional struggles within territorial bounds. At worst, regionalism can give vent to racism and other forms of localism generated at lower spatial scales. But regionalism and connected claims to national sovereignty can also be a basis for progressive social movements, and these succeed to the extent that they continue to challenge not just regional but national containment of struggle—to the extent that their project is a global not just nationalist anti-imperialism.

Nation. If it represents a division of the world market, the national scale is nonetheless primarily a political construct, the site of state power. It was not always so. State power in earlier social formations was often vested at the urban scale as in the city-states of Greece or West Africa, or at the regional

scale with an array of duchies and fiefdoms, sheikhdoms and sultanates. By contrast, the nation-state evolved as the dominant scale of state power with the emergence of capitalism, and it differs from past formations of the state in that citizenship is defined exclusively on the basis of a territorial rather than kinship definition of the nation, as betokened by the comparatively recent invention of passports and erection of fences, walls, and customs posts. The more extensive scale of the nation-state compared with its predecessors resulted largely from the increased scale of economic activity and accumulation attendant on an emergent capitalism, but the actual boundaries separating nation-states are more usually the product of war, military conquest, political disputes, and treaties.

If a territorial definition of the "body politic" supersedes a genetic one, the localism inherent in the latter is not thereby vanquished. Ethnic, racial, religious, or regional differences can divide the nation-state internally, and citizenship confers foreign status as surely and as emotionally as it confers national identity. Nationalism is perhaps the most impermeable of spatially based *ideologies*—in contrast to the increasing economic porosity of national *boundaries*—and challenges to state power only rarely question its basis per se or the legitimacy of the national scale of social organization. The majority of nationalist struggles and challenges to the nation-state seek not to abolish the power of the nation-state but to replace the leadership. But there are exceptions, and the nation-state is today a peculiarly vulnerable scale of social organization. First, to the extent that capital organizes itself through the world market, global corporations may retain significant economic power over nation-states. The working class too can outflank national ruling classes by organizing internationally, but despite the long-established ambition that "Workers of the World Unite," the international working class is nowhere as organized as its adversary. Nationalism has largely contained class-based assaults on state power, from the shambles of the Second International in 1914 to the diversion of postcolonial struggles throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia into the reconstruction of separate national bourgeoisies. The same fate befell Poland's Solidarnosc.

State power is held not only by a minority ruling class, but generally by men and possibly too by a distinct racial, ethnic, or religious group. To the extent that these social interests are systematically incorporated in the legal and ideological fabric of the state, exploitation and oppression on the basis of class, race, gender, and other social differences are institutionalized in national structures of enfranchisement and property law. As such the state also polices the borders of lower spatial scales, especially the body, home, and community, and challenges to state power emanate from these and other sources of oppression (including environmental) even if they are rarely so neatly defined. It was the patriarchal state Virginia Woolf sought to vault over when she declared:

"As a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world."[43]

Global Boundaries. It might seem that the borders of the global scale are self-evidently given by the natural borders of the planet, but as with other scales, the global scale per se is socially produced. The world of the Roman Empire, to take an obvious example, covered only a small percentage of the planet's surface, while conversely, the realities of space travel strongly suggest the imminent expansion of the "global" scale. Indeed, hundreds of billions of dollars devoted to space travel have already had a significant effect on the world economy over the last four decades. With the capitalist mode of production, the global scale is primarily a construct of the circulation of capital.

The conquest of the global scale is difficult to discuss except historically. Subplanetary global worlds—whether highly localized as with the various peoples of Amazonia, Central Africa, or Borneo who were periodically "discovered" by nineteenth-century European explorers, or the larger empires such as Ming Dynasty China—were constructed by various mixes of political, cultural, economic, and ideological power. The economic construction of a unified global scale came only with the globalization of the world market in the late nineteenth century. Since then the global scale has been demarcated less by the political expansion of nationally based European capitals; rather it is the internal dynamics of economically uneven development, structured according to the specific social and economic relations of capitalist society, that pattern the global scale. Accordingly, the global is divided not only according to the political divisions of the nation-state, but according to the differential levels of development and underdevelopment experienced and achieved by these states in the world market.

The conquest of the global scale may seem like an impossible idea or set of events to grasp, but it is very real. In class terms, the capitalist class came to rule through a series of more or less recognizable national revolutions between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries—some were violent political overthrows of previous ruling classes, while others were quieter revolutions resulting from an accretion of power in the market. The important point is that they did not remain isolated in separate states; through political as well as economic means the rising bourgeoisie actively coalesced different islands of national power into global hegemony. Integrally involved were not only projects of class domination but also of oppression, especially, but not exclusively, on the basis of race and gender: third world labor forces are largely comprised not simply of "workers" but of women workers, black workers, brown workers. These intertwined histories of conquest—enslavement, robbery, denial of property ownership, disenfranchisement—sought to contain incipient social struggles at a lower geographical scale, as struggles over the body or over nationalism, for example, while asserting the global claims of capitalism.

The opposition to contemporary global power emerges out of a number of

nationally as well as internationally based struggles: not only the more obvious anti-imperialist and antiwar movements, and postcolonial struggles, but also environmental and feminist movements that may have more local inspiration but global potential. The ability of revolutionary socialism, rooted in a class analysis of capitalist society, to extract a whole nation-state from global capitalism provoked an extraordinary global defense involving an economic embargo, placing sixteen national armies on Soviet soil in 1919, and leading eventually to the cold war. Despite its avowed internationalism, however, and with the failed revolutions of 1919, the Soviet leadership failed to "jump scales." They were not only contained as a hostile island in the world economy by the capitalist embargo, but under Stalin succumbed to the disastrous belief in "socialism in one country." Socialism in the former Soviet Union was stifled many decades before the events of 1989.

If the political connectedness of the bourgeois revolutions and their class, gender, and racial agendas are today erased in the jingoistic celebration of separate national independence days and revolutionary wars, this ideological erasure comprises part of a perpetual policing of the global scale. Insofar as the ruling class attempts to reproduce its own vision of the world, it also seeks to establish a definition of global alongside national citizenship. The erasure of difference implied in "the universal subject" is one insinuation of such global citizenship, but it also takes more popular forms. "The global" is very actively constructed. "We do business in only one place," reads a Salomon Brothers ad for their financial services, beneath a dreamy space-shot of Spaceship Earth.

The critique of the universal subject has itself become nearly universal, but the more difficult question is how a political subject or coalition of subjects can be reconstructed without, on the one hand, replicating the assumption of a white, male, ruling-class subject, and on the other, reverting to a radical individualism. This familiar epistemological dilemma seems to require a negotiation of privilege based on different subject positionalities, and is usually thereby seen as a quintessentially local project. But the reconstruction of the political subjects(s) is at the same time intensely global. "The personal," Cynthia Enloe reminds us, in an ambitious vision of jumping scales, "is international"—an appropriate response also to the triteness of "Think globally, act locally." To such defeatism, one can only respond that it is necessary to "think globally, and act globally, too."

To avert any dangers of academic idealism, the discussion about a reconstructed political subject also needs to take place with greater attention to the *objects* of political conquest. It was only eighteen years but a very long way from Jim Morrison's 1967 threat—"We want the world and we want it now"—to the thoroughly idealist Band Aid lament of the 1980s: "We are the world." "We" are not the world, but there are many who still want it, and we will only find the internally differentiated identity of "we" insofar as we also continue to want the world.[44]

Conclusion

Marx detected in capitalism a tendency toward what he called "the annihilation of space by time."[45] We can see this at all scales—from the global, where advances in communications and transportation technology quite literally make for a smaller world, to the differential deterritorialization of the male and female bodies much as de Beauvoir detected and indeed mirrored. A spatialized politics recovers space from this annihilation, much as Lefebvre's notion of the production of space seeks to recover social space from the abstractions constructed by the capitalist state or through the market.[46] This suggests the double-edged nature of scale. By setting boundaries, scale can be constructed as a means of constraint and exclusion, a means of imposing identity, but a politics of scale can also become a weapon of expansion and inclusion, a means of enlarging identities. Scale offers guideposts in the recovery of space from annihilation and a language via which the redifferentiation of space can be pioneered on freely argued and agreed-upon social grounds rather than according to the economic logic of capital and the political interests of its class.

Notes

1. On the homeless vehicle, see David V. Lurie and Krzysztof Wodiczko, "Homeless Vehicle Project," *October* 47 (1988), 53–67; Daniel, Krzysztof, Oscar, and Victor, "Conversations about a Project for a Homeless Vehicle," *October* 47 (1988), 68–76; and the catalogue for Wodiczko's exhibit at Exit Art: Krzysztof Wodiczko and David Lurie, *New York City Tableaux: Tompkins Square. The Homeless Vehicle Project* (New York: Exit Art, 1990).

2. The lower estimate of homelessness is from Peter Marcuse, "Isolating Homelessness from Housing," in Carol Caton, ed., *The Homeless in America* (New York: Oxford University Press). The higher figure was publicized by the Coalition for the Homeless in 1987, although they later revised this downward to 70,000. In 1986, the city of New York would admit at most only half of this figure, and as the number of homeless people clearly grew in the late 1980s they simply stopped reporting any figures at all. The language of "the evicted" is from Rosalyn Deutsche, who argues that it better elucidates "the specific historical, rather than mythical reasons for the presence of today's homeless." See Rosalyn Deutsche, "Uneven Development: Public Art in New York City," *October* 47 (1988), 8.

3. Wodiczko and Lurie, "The Homeless Vehicle," in *New York City Tableaux*, 22.

4. Papo Colo, "Living Rights Are Human Rights," in *New York City Tableaux*, 2.

5. Deutsche, "Uneven Development," 47–52.

6. For an early discussion of the urban geography of homeless people, predating the burgeoning homelessness of the 1980s, see James Duncan, "Men without Property: The Tramp's Classification and Use of Urban Space," Antipode 10 (1978), 24–34. More recently, see Susan Ruddick, "Heterotopias of the Homeless: Strategies and Tactics of Placemaking in Los Angeles," Strategies 3 (1990), 184–201.

7. Colo, "Living Rights," 2; Deutsche, "Uneven Development," 50; and Don Mitchell, "Land and Labor: Worker Resistance and the Production of Landscape in California" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1992), chap. 5.

8. Krzysztof Wodiczko, "Poliscar" (New York: Josh Baer Gallery, n.d.), 9.

9. Patrick Wright, "Home Is Where the Cart Is" in *The Independent on Sunday*, 12 January 1992, 14.

10. On gentrification in the Lower East Side, see Neil Smith, Betsy Duncan, and Laura Reid, "From Disinvestment to Reinvestment: Tax Arrears and Turning Points in the East Village," *Housing Studies* 4 (1989), 238–52. For a synoptic history of Tompkins Square Park, see Neil Smith, "Tompkins Square Park Time Line," *New York City Tableaux*, 14–20. For a broader assessment see Smith, "Lower East Side as Wild Wild West: New City as New Frontier," in Michael Sorkin, ed., *Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 61–93. For a parallel case of parks and homelessness, see Don Mitchell, "Iconography and Locational Conflict from the Underside: Free Speech, People's Park, and the Politics of Homelessness in Berkeley, California," *Political Geography* 11, 152–69.

11. From geography, see especially the work of David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973); *Limits to Capital* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); *The Urbanization of Capital* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); and most recently, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). See also Derek Gregory, *Ideology, Science, and Human Geography* (London: Hutchinson, 1978); Michael Watts, *Silent Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984); Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift, eds., *New Models in Geography: The Political Economy Perspective* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); and Cindi Katz and Andrew Kirby, "In the Nature of Things: The Environment and Everyday Life," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, n.s 16 (1991). From the side of social theory, the "discovery" of space (and spatial concepts) has been advanced by Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977); Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981); Michel Foucault, "Questions on Geography," in Colin Gordon, ed., *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972– 1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 63–77; Marshall Berman, *Everything That Is Solid Melts into Air* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); Elspeth Probyn, "Travels in the Local: Making Sense of the Local," in Linda J. Nicholson, ed., *Feminism/Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 176–89. For a more historical approach, see E. D. Genovese and L. Hochberg, eds., *Geographic Perspectives in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). From literary criticism, see Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (1984), 71-89; Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978); Edward Said, "Narrative, Geography, and Interpretation," *New Left Review* 180 (1990), 81–97; and Kristin Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). Of course, these categories of geography, social theory, and literary criticism are not discrete and involve considerable and growing overlap. This is nowhere better exemplified than in the pioneering work of Henri Lefebvre, "Reflections on the Politics of Space," *Antipode* 8 (1976), 30–37; *La Révolution Urbaine* (Paris: Maspero, 1970); and *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

12. Jameson, "Postmodernism," 71, 89.

13. But consider the debate over the legal and territorial constitution of the United States where the different geographical scales of political organization were keenly contested as very different models of political power. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

14. See Neil Smith, "Geography as Museum: Private History and Conservative Idealism in 'The Nature of Geography,'" in J. Nicholas Entrikin and Stanley D. Brunn, eds., *Reflections on Richard Hartshorne's "The Nature of Geography"* (Washington, D.C.: Occasional Publication of the Association of American Geographers), 91–120; and Peter Gould, "Reflections Require a Mirror," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81 (1991), 328–34.

15. Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 68.

16. Ibid., 69–70.

17. For an earlier exploration of material and metaphorical space on which the present discussion builds, see the "Afterword: The Beginning of Geography," in Smith, *Uneven Development* (1990), 160–78.

18. See Dick Hebdige, "Metaphors out of Control," *Mapping the Futures* (London: Macmillan, 1933).

19. Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 70.

20. In *Production of Space*, Lefebvre makes a very similar argument about the need to investigate the origins and meanings of spatial metaphors. It should be pointed out that for Lefebvre, Foucault was one of the main culprits in the opportunistic use of spatial metaphors.

21. Smith, *Uneven Development*, 135–47. For a more empirical analysis of the production of scale see Neil Smith and Ward Dennis, "The Restructuring of Geographical Scale: Coalescence and Fragmentation of the Northern Core Region," *Economic Geography* 63 (1987), 160–82. The debate on scale has emerged mostly in the journal *Antipode* as part of the larger debate on localities and locality studies. See N. Smith, "Dangers of the Empirical Turn: Some Comments on the CURS Initiative," *Antipode* 19 (1987), 59–68; K. Cox and A. Mair, "Levels of Abstraction in Locality Studies," *Antipode* 21 (1989), 121–32; S. Duncan and M. Savage, "Space, Scale, and Locality," *Antipode* 21 (1989), 179–206.

22. While focusing on the political construction of scale, Andrew Herod emphasizes that the production of scale is a far more complex question than can be captured through a narrowly based political economic analysis. See his "The Production of Scale in United States Labour Relations," *Area* 23 (1991), 82–88.

23. Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, 167.

24. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 136.

25. Judith Butler, "Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, and Foucault," in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., *Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 129.

26. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: 1952). There is of course considerable debate over Beauvoir's formulation. See especially Monique Wittig's denial of any presocial sexual difference underpinning the social construction of gender (*The Lesbian Body*. [New York: Avon Press, 1975]). Butler's criticism, that "Beauvoir's dialectic of self and Other argues the limits of a Cartesian version of disembodied freedom" seems especially apt ("Variations on Sex and Gender," 133). Indeed Beauvoir's dualism seems to relegate women to entrapment in the space of the body vis-à-vis the freedom of men in time.

27. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, 122–55.

28. Sallie A. Marston, "Transforming the Boundaries: Power and Resistance Among Turn of the Century American Women" (paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers, Sheffield, 2–5 January 1991).

29. Douglas Crimp, "How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic," *October* 43 (1987), 237–71.

30. Witold Rybczynski, *Home: A Short History of an Idea* (New York: Viking, 1986), 72; Michèle Barrett, *Women's Oppression Today* (London: Verso, 1980).

31. Anthony Giddens's discovery of social space and time-space distanciation pivots upon a generalization of these most elementary divisions within the home. For no apparent reason, the home becomes the basis for a metaphorical "regionalization" that elides all differences of spatial scale. See *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 110–44.

32. Cindi Katz, "Growing Girls, Closing Circles," in C. Katz and J. Monk, eds., *Full Circles: Geographies of Women Over the Life Course* (London: Routledge, 1993).

33. Jacqueline Leavitt and Susan Saegert, *From Abandonment to Hope* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

34. Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). I present these contrasting relations of community and neighborhood in an overly binary form.

This is brought about by the abbreviated and highly schematic nature of this discussion and is not at all intended as an assertion of dual "ideal types."

35. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 236.

36. Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question* (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), 439–52.

37. David Harvey and Lata Chaterjee, "Absolute Rent and the Structuring of Space by Financial Institutions," *Antipode* 6 (1974), 22–36; Ann Markusen, "City Spatial Structure, Women's Household Work, and National Urban Policy," *Signs* 5 (1980), 23–44; Linda McDowell, "Towards an Understanding of the Gender Division of Urban Space," *Environment and Planning D* 1 (1983), 59–72; Liz Bondi, "Gender Divisions and Gentrification: A Critique," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, n.s. 16 (1991), 190–98.

38. Allen J. Scott, *New Industrial Spaces* (London: Pion, 1988).

39. Smith and Dennis, "The Restructuring of Geographical Scale."

40. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 42.

41. Smith and Dennis, "The Restructuring of Geographical Scale"; Scott, *New Industrial Spaces*.

42. Herod, "The Production of Scale."

43. Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (London: Hogarth, 1952).

44. Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 195. See also Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* for what I take to be a similar vision, and Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," in Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 183–201.

45. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 524, 539.

46. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*.